
To find a Nash equilibrium in a payoff matrix, mark each player's best response to every strategy the other player could choose. Any cell marked as a best response for both players is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. At that cell, neither player can improve their own payoff by changing strategy alone.
The reliable routine is simple: read the payoff order, compare the row player's payoffs within each column, compare the column player's payoffs within each row, and look for overlapping marks. Then test the candidate by checking both one-sided deviations.
A payoff matrix lists the result of every strategy combination. In a pair such as (4, 6), the first number usually belongs to the row player and the second to the column player, unless the question states otherwise. A best response is the strategy that gives a player the highest available payoff after the other player's choice is treated as fixed.
A Nash equilibrium is a combination of mutual best responses. The important word is unilateral: one player changes while the other holds still. The equilibrium does not promise the highest total payoff, fairness, or the outcome both players like most. It says only that no single player has a profitable one-person switch.
Why scan columns for the row player? A column represents the column player's fixed choice, so the row player can only move up or down. The same logic turns sideways for the column player: with the row fixed, that player can only move left or right.

Cafe A chooses the row and Cafe B chooses the column. Each chooses a High or Low price. The payoffs are weekly profit in thousands of euros, written (A, B): High–High gives (4, 4), High–Low gives (1, 6), Low–High gives (6, 1), and Low–Low gives (2, 2).
Start with Cafe A. If B chooses High, A compares 4 from High with 6 from Low, so Low is A's best response. If B chooses Low, A compares 1 with 2, so Low is again A's best response. Circle A's 6 in the High column and A's 2 in the Low column.
Now mark Cafe B's choices. If A chooses High, B compares 4 from High with 6 from Low, so Low is B's best response. If A chooses Low, B compares 1 with 2, so Low is again B's best response. Underline B's 6 in the High row and B's 2 in the Low row.
The marks overlap only at Low–Low, with payoff (2, 2). Test it numerically. If A alone switches to High while B stays Low, A's profit falls from 2 to 1. If B alone switches to High while A stays Low, B's profit also falls from 2 to 1. Neither cafe benefits from a unilateral deviation, so Low–Low is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Both cafes would earn 4 at High–High, which is better for each than the 2 earned at Low–Low. Yet High–High is not stable: if B stays High, A can switch to Low and raise its payoff from 4 to 6. B faces the same temptation. The matrix separates collective desirability from individual stability.
That distinction is why Nash equilibrium matters in economics and business. It provides a disciplined prediction for strategic settings where each person's best move depends on what others do. It also reveals when incentives can trap players in an outcome they would jointly prefer to avoid.
Do not stop after finding the first overlap. In a coordination game, both players may prefer matching choices, so two diagonal cells can be mutual best responses. Both are pure-strategy Nash equilibria, even if one gives higher payoffs than the other.
The marks can also fail to overlap. In matching pennies, one player wants the choices to match and the other wants them to differ, so someone wants to switch at every pure-strategy cell. That means there is no pure equilibrium. For a finite game, Nash's existence result guarantees at least one equilibrium when mixed strategies—probability distributions over pure choices—are allowed, but calculating that is a different method.

If one cafe keeps High, the other can switch to Low and raise its own payoff from 4 to 6. A profitable unilateral deviation exists, so the cell fails the Nash test.
Holding B at Low, A would fall from 2 to 1 by switching. Holding A at Low, B would also fall from 2 to 1 by switching. Both strategies are best responses to each other.
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Do not conclude that the game has no equilibrium at all; a mixed-strategy equilibrium may still exist.
Holt and Roth, The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
University of Chicago: Basic Game Theory—Pure Nash Equilibria
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